Almost six hours after the arrest, a detective again advised Taylor of his Miranda rights, and again had him sign an acknowledgment. Though advised to cooperate, Taylor remained adamant in his denials. Shortly thereafter, Taylor met with his girlfriend and a male companion in the detective's office. 15 After the meeting, Taylor signed a waiver-ofrights form and confessed to his involvement in the robbery of the grocery store.
At trial, Taylor moved to suppress the confession, arguing that it was the tainted "fruit" of the illegal arrest. The trial court denied the motion and Taylor was convicted. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed, holding that the causal connection between the initial police illegality and the confession had not been severed, and hence that the confession was not admissible under the rule of Brown v. Illinois.' 6 The Supreme Court of Alabama in turn reversed, reinstating the trial court verdict. It held that the confession was admissible because after the illegal arrest there had been a finding of probable cause, based on the fingerprint comparison, which broke the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession.1 7 III. CONTROLLING LAW Any evidence which the police discover, directly or indirectly, as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. t 8 The initially seized evidence (or the illegal search of a seized person) represents the "poisonous tree." All evidence subsequently derived from the illegally seized evidence is the "fruit" of the poisonous tree insofar as it has been tainted by the initial official illegality. 19 Under the exclusionary rule both primary and secondary evidence obtained in this manner is inadmissible in criminal prosecutions.
The exclusionary rule, while not an explicit requirement of the Constitution, 20 is a judicially created tool invoked to effectuate two related fourth amendment policy objectives: deterrence of unlawful police 15 It is not clear from the record whether they were alone or whether a policeman was present, nor is it certain whether the meeting was arranged by the police or if it was Taylor's own idea. Moreover, there is some controversy as to what actually transpired at the meeting. 102 S. Ct. at 2668 n.1; id. at 2670 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 22 holding that the federal government could not use illegally seized evidence in a criminal trial. 23 The rule that derivative evidence is also tainted emerged in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 24 The Court there held that all evidence derived from illegally seized evidence must likewise be excluded, 25 unless such derivative evidence would have been discovered inevitably, notwithstanding the official illegality, or if it was received from a collateral source unrelated to the official illegality. 26 Later, in Nardone v. United States, 27 Justice Frankfurter characterized evidence tainted by official illegality as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," 28 and held that all such evidence must be excluded unless "[a]s a matter of good sense . . .such connection [between the illegal seizure and the proffered evidence] may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 29 In Wong Sun v. United States,30 the Court included verbal evidence under the umbrella of the exclusionary rule. Previously, if confessions were voluntary for the purpose of the fifth amendment, they were admissible notwithstanding any prior police illegality. 3 1 In extending the exclusionary rule to verbal evidence, the Wong Sun Court noted:
21 Seegenral4y Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."). The rule preserves judicial integrity, since the admission of tainted evidence would be tantamount to condoning the illegal methods of its procurement. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963 The Court held that Wong Sun's arrest was illegal because it resulted from his co-defendant's tainted confession. The Court also found that Wong Sun's release from police custody for several days and his voluntary return to confess, however, broke the presumption of a causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession. Thus, the Court in Wong Sun not only included verbal evidence in the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, but also identified a determinative factor attenuating the primary taint: the release of a defendant from police custody. The Wong Sun Court eschewed the notion that all verbal evidence stemming from an illegal arrest should necessarily be excluded from evidence at trial.
3 4 Though there is a presumption that the illegal arrest is the cause of a subsequent confession, the presumption is rebuttable under Wong Sun if the confession is the result of "an intervening. . . act of a free will." ' 35 The failure of the Court in Wong Sun to define specific criteria for determining attenuation of the primary taint, however, left state and federal courts free to adopt widely differing thresholds of attenuation. IT]he connection between the unconstitutional intrusion and the booty offered at trial is so automatic and inevitable that the latter is readily seen as the 'fruit' of the unconstitutional act. But when the object improperly seized is a person and the alleged 'fruit' is a statement by him, there intervenes the individual's own decision to speak. In Brown v. llinois, 37 the Court attempted to coalesce the holding of Wong Sun into a multifactor test for determining when the taint of an illegal arrest has become so attenuated as to purge the confession. At the same time, however, it acknowledged the need for a flexible application of the exclusionary rule. 38 In Brown, without probable cause or a warrant, the police had entered Brown's apartment, searched it, and then arrested him when he returned home. 39 They gave Brown his Miranda warnings. At the station, the police confronted Brown with information about a shooting they were investigating, and within two hours of his illegal arrest, Brown confessed to the crime. 40 The Court in Brown rejected the Illinois Supreme Court holding that Miranda warnings alone purge the taint of an illegal arrest, and eschewed the adoption of any alternative per se rule. Instead, the Court set forth three factors for courts to consider when determining whether the taint of an illegal arrest has become so attenuated as to purge the confession. The first of these factors is the temporal proximity of the illegal arrest and the confession. 4 official misconduct. 4 6 The Court found that the police, with information far less than probable cause, arrested Brown for investigatory purposes only. Thus, the underlying sense of purposefulness strongly demonstrated serious police misconduct. The Court also considered, to a lesser degree, the manner of Brown's arrest, which was "calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. '4 7 The Court in Brown did not delineate the relationship among these factors to set forth a clear test of when taint of an illegal arrest may become purged. Rather, the Court explicitly acknowledged that its approach relies to a large degree upon judicial discretion. 48 It is clear from
Brown that exclusion of a confession is almost certain where flagrant and purposeful police conduct has occurred; the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule demands that much, as does the preservation of judicial integrity. Still, Brown left unresolved the question of whether confessions should be excluded if the police misconduct was technical or non-purposeful. 49 Further, since there were no intervening circumstances in Brown, the decision did not establish a standard of what constitutes a sufficient intervening cause; it merely acknowledged the findings of intervention in Wong Sun and Johnson v. Lousiana.
50
The Court in Dunaway v. New York 5 ' found the facts there to be virtually indentical to those in Brown ,52 and accordingly applied the Brown multifactor test. Finding that the temporal proximity between the defendant's illegal arrest and the confession was only two hours, that there were no significant intervening circumstances, and that the police acted with an attitude of purposefulness, the Court in Dunaway excluded the confession. 53 It reaffirmed Brown's holding that Miranda warnings alone do not purge the taint of an illegal arrest, but it did not clarify the factors of temporal proximity and intervening circumstances. It did, however, narrow the interpretation of the official misconduct, determining that this factor is relevant only in terms of the flagrancy of the fourth amendment violation, not in terms of the manner in which the illegal arrest is accomplished. In 1980, the Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky 55 applied the Brown test in dicta. While subjected to an illegal detention and search, the petitioner admitted to owning illegal drugs. The petitioner subsequently claimed that his admission should be suppressed as the fruit of his illegal detention. 56 The Court applied the first factor of the Brown test, temporal proximity, and noted that only forty-five minutes had elapsed between the arrest and the admission. Determining that this by itself was inconclusive, 57 the Court proceeded to the factor of intervening circumstances. Because the defendant confessed to the ownership of the drugs contemporaneously with the discovery of the drugs, Justice Rehnquist concluded for the majority that the confession was motivated by the intervening event of the discovery of the drugs themselves and not the illegal arrest. 58 Justice Rehnquist gave the least weight to the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct: "The conduct of the police here does not rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring prophylactic exclusion of petitioner's statements. '59 The Court's decision in Rawlings cast a shadow of ambiguity upon the holdings in Brown and Dunaway. Nowhere in Brown or Dunaway did the Court suggest that the absence of conscious flagrancy on the part of the police should, in itself, lead to the admission of confessions made subsequent to an illegal arrest. Insofar as the Court in Rawlings determined that the arrest and detention of the defendant was legal, its decision on the admissibility of the confession was dicta. Also, since the search which lead to the discovery of the drugs directly resulted from the initial illegality, it could hardly be construed thereafter as an independent intervening event which "contributed to [petitioner's] ability to consider carefully his . . .options and . . .excercise his free will." 60 The
Court's dicta in Rawlings raises even greater confusion in that if the arrest and detention of the defendent were illegal, then the subsequent search was tainted. Thus, the defendant's admission, which resulted 55 448 U.S. 98 (1980) . 56 The police entered the defendant's home pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for one Marquess. They did not find him there. While searching for him, however, the police smelled marijuana, and two of the officers left to get a search warrant. The remaining officers detained the occupants. When the officers returned with the search warrant, they read the occupants their Miranda rights. The police emptied a purse and discovered illegal drugs. The defendant admitted to ownership of the drugs. The police searched the defendant, and then arrested him. Though the Court found that the detention and search were lawful, they discussed the admissibility of the tainted confession in arguendo. Id. at 100-10.
57 A forty-five minute interval should probably raise a strong presumption of taint since the interval in both from the disclosure of drugs found during the search, was thereby tainted, and inadmissible. 61 The Raw/'ng Court's application of the Brown test in dicta is inconsistent with the holding in Brown and the policies underlying the exclusionary rule.
IV. OPINIONS IN TAYLOR
In Taylor, five members of the Court relied exclusively upon Brown and Dunaway when arriving at their decision to suppress the confession of Omar Taylor. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, applied Brown's multifactor test to determine whether Taylor's confession resulted from police exploitation of the illegal arrest, or whether the taint of the illegal arrest had become so attenuated as to purge the confession and render it admissible for the purposes of the fourth amendment.
62
The temporal proximity of the illegal arrest and the confession is the most ambiguous of the three factors of the Brown test, 63 and the Court declined to hold that the six hour detention by itself was sufficient to attenuate the taint of the illegal arrest. Though Brown and Dunaway each involved only two-hour detentions, "a difference of a few hours is not significant where, as here, petitioner was in police custody, unrepresented by counsel, fingerprinted . . . and subjected to a lineup. '6 4 Thus, temporal proximity by itself will rarely prove sufficient attenuation; rather, it is the quality of the detention and the presence of intervening events which are determinative. 65 The majority's cursory disposition of the temporal proximity factor indicated their dissatisfaction with it as a reliable indicator of attenuation.
The Taylor majority also followed Brown in weighing the factor of intervening circumstances which might break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession. Possible intervening circumstances in Taylor included repeated Miranda warnings. The Taylor majority reaffirmed the reasoning set forth in Brown that Miranda warnings address the fifth amendment issue of voluntariness, and that a "finding of 'voluntariness' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis." ' The majority also rejected the contention that Taylor's visit with his girlfriend and a male companion was an intervening event which broke the chain of causation between the illegal arrest and the confession. Justice Marshall declared that an intervening event will only break the chain of causation when it "contributed to [the defendant 's] ability to consider carefully . . .his options and to exercise his free will."68 This indicates that the event must, in effect, dissipate the aura of coercion surrounding the illegal arrest; it cannot simply substitute one source of coercion for another. The majority also held that the ex parte warrant, filed after Taylor's arrest and based upon the comparison of Taylor's fingerprints with those found at the scene of the crime, did not purge the taint of the illegal arrest. Because the fingerprints themselves were the fruit of the illegal arrest, the police could not use them to purge the taint of the initial illegality. 69 Lastly, the majority addressed the third factor of the Brown test: the flagrancy and purposefulness of the official misconduct. As in Dunaway, the majority applied this factor in terms of the flagrancy of the fourth amendment violation, not in terms of whether the defendant was subjected to intimidating police misconduct thereafter. 70 Since the police arrested Taylor without a warrant or probable cause, and for purely investigatory reasons, the Court found that the official misconduct was flagrant.
71
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, pointed out that Taylor's arrest was neither violent, nor designed to "cause surprise, fright, and confusion." '72 Justice O'Connor argued that this absence of police culthat cured all Fourth Amendment violations, then the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures would be reduced to a mere 'form of words.'" Id. at 2668 (quoting 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) ).
67 The rationale behind this, though it is not clearly articulated by the Court, is that Miranda warnings are given to protect a defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, while the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to effectuate the underlying policies of the fourth amendment by deterring the police from engaging in illegal searches and seizures. 
SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE
[o7 pability should be weighed in favor of admission of the confession. Notwithstanding the Dunaway Court's rejection of the relevance of the manner in which the illegal arrest is accomplished, Justice O'Connor seemed to suggest that good faith on the part of the police should militate against suppression of the evidence. 73 In response, the majority simply commented that it would not at this time recognize a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.
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The dissent chiefly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the facts. 75 Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the thresholds that the majority attached to the factors of the Brown test. The dissent contended that the majority erred in failing to consider the three Miranda warnings given to Taylor, since Brown had held Miranda warnings to be an important factor in the analysis. 76 Further, the dissent construed the visit of the girlfriend and the male companion as an intervening event which broke the chain of causation, because Taylor's confession followed hard on the heels of that visit. 77 Finally, the dissent implied that, because Taylor was alone during most of his six hours in detention, 78 while in Brown and in Dunaway the defendants had been interrogated throughout their detentions until they confessed, Taylor's confession was not obtained by exploitation of his illegal arrest. 79 The dissent then accused the majority of applying the three factors of the Brown test separately rather than cumulatively, thereby ignoring the context of the case as a whole. 80 
V. ANALYSIS AND RAMIFICATIONS
Since Wong Sun 8 t the Court has applied the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine on a case-by-case basis. The Brown test, which was supposed to coalesce the factors of attenuation into a precise and practical test, still requires the trial court to make an implicit judgment about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule before it can apply the test. The Court's adoption of the Brown test in Dunaway without further clarification perpetuated the confusion over the proper standards of attenuation neces-sary to purge the taint of official illegality. The Taylor majority's failure to provide substantive guidelines as to how much weight each of the factors of the Brown test should be accorded will surely exacerbate the vagaries surrounding the notion of attenuation.
The absence of clear standards has encouraged courts to marshal facts according to their perception of the police misconduct and the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in deterring it. The fifth circuit's adoption of a "good faith" exception poses an extreme example. The "good faith" exception provides for the admission of illegally obtained evidence if the police had acted upon a reasonable good faith belief that their actions were proper. 8 2 Such attempts to eviscerate the exclusionary rule by undermining its deterrent effect through the use of the good faith exception will not be stemmed by the Court's decison in Tlor. The fourth amendment's protection against illegal searches and seizures will become unenforceable without the deterrent arm of the exclusionary rule. The Taylor decision does uphold the exclusionary rule insofar as it ruled against the admission of a confession tainted by official illegality. Yet, it allows so much flexibility in determining the sufficiency of attenuation that it has virtually granted "home rule" to the state and federal courts to assign their own weights and measures to the importance of the fourth amendment. Of course, a body of law is emerging as the Court decides more cases on the issue which, by the sheer diversity of fact situations, should gradually clarify the factors of attenuation. If, however, the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule is effective deterrence of fourth amendment violations, 3 then the Court must bring the lower courts in line to a common standard by clearly delineating the relationship among the three factors of the Brown test. To determine whether the taint of an illegal arrest has been purged under the Brown test, a court must find: whether sufficient time has passed between the illegal arrest and the confession; whether an independent intervening event has broken the causal chain; and whether the official misconduct was flagrant or purposeful. 8 4 It is not clear whether these factors are to be considered cumulatively or individually. The Taylor majority examined each factor in isolation to see if it alone would be sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. The dissent accused the majority of attempting to "divide and conquer" the Brown test by failing to consider the circumstances of the case as a whole. presumed flagrant police misconduct from the initial fourth amendment violation. It required a demonstrably effective break in the causal chain between the arrest and the confession to refute the presumption of the official misconduct. 8 6 The dissent, on the other hand, examined the facts from the perspective that the police misconduct was neither flagrant nor purposeful, and it marshalled facts to support the admission of the confession.
7
The Court has decided whether various circumstances are sufficient to break the chain of causation between an illegal arrest and a confession. In Wang Sun, release from police custody was sufficient. 88 In Brown, Miranda warnings were insufficient. 89 In Johnson v. Louisiana, being brought before a magistrate with counsel for a determination of probable cause was sufficient. 9° In Taylor, a visit with a girlfriend was insufficient, 91 as was confrontation with fingerprint evidence obtained after an illegal arrest. 92 The problem with such fact specific rules is that these precedents provide little direction for determining and applying a manageable standard of attenuation outside of those infrequent fact scenarios which resemble an already decided case. Certainly, the source of the intervention must be beyond the instrumentality of the police. 93 Yet the question remains as to what sort of intervention attenuates the taint. There appear to be two distinct standards. The higher standard is that the intervening event must not itself cause the confession, but that the confession must originate outside the aura of coercion that surrounds the illegal detention. 94 The clearest example of this is Wang Sun, where the defendant confessed only after leaving police custody and returning voluntarily. The higher standard is the standard implicitly adopted by the Taylor majority. Justice Marshall particularly doubted that Taylor's visit with his girlfriend amounted to sufficient intervention because the visit itself could have caused Taylor to confess. 9 [Vol. 73
1ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
would permit a finding of attenuation if it is the intervention itself which causes the defendant to confess. Justice O'Connor adopted this standard in her dissent when she contended that the meeting should have constituted an intevening circumstance because it, and not the initial illegality, caused Taylor to confess.
6
The higher standard, implicitly adopted by majority is both more objective and less prone to manipulation because it requires a clear showing that the defendant was outside of the influence of the police custody for a significant amount of time. It ensures that the source of the intervention is beyond the instrumentality of the police, and that it is therefore beyond the reach of sophisticated prosecutorial argument. The lower standard, on the other hand, encourages conjecture as to the cause of the confession, and thus allows ample room for the courts to marshal the facts to generate a plausible intervention. The lower standard has generally been applied when a defendant confesses because he is confronted with evidence of a crime. 9 7 One court even held that a brief phone call was sufficient intervention to purge the taint of an illegal arrest. 98 Even though the Taylor majority applied the higher standard to the facts, the lower courts will not necessarily follow its lead. The Supreme Court limited its holding to the facts, and is not in a position to review the many cases on the issue. To preserve the deterrent effectiveness of the exclusionary rule and to effectuate the commands of the fourth amendment, the Court should have clearly required the higher standard for intervention that it itself applied.
The Taylor majority also left unclear how courts, in determining whether the taint of the illegal arrest has been purged, should interpret the flagrancy of the official misconduct. The facts in Taylor suggest that the absence of malicious motivation on the part of the police should not militate against suppression, since the majority refused to recognize a "good faith" exception. Further, the Taylor decision suggests that if there is any flagrantly unconstitutional behavior by government officials beyond the actual fourth amendment violation, confessions must be suppressed, in spite of arguable intervening circumstances, in order to deter such official misconduct. These conclusions, however, must be gleaned from the opinion because the majority did not explicitly set forth guidelines for the interpretation of the relevance of official misconduct. . 1978), aJdon rehearing, 612  F.2d 906, cert. denitd, 449 U.S. 835 (1980) .
In addition to the ambiguity in Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor on this point-, several of the justices of the Court have themselves advocated the adoption of a good faith exception. 9 9 Justice Powell, concurring in part in Brown, suggested distinguishing between differing degrees of fourth amendment violations and applying a sliding threshold of attenuation to each. t°0 At one end of Powell's sliding scale-would be cases in which there is flagrantly unconstitutional behavior by government officials, 10 1 based upon the officer's unreasonable ascertainment of probable cause, or upon the use of the arrest as a pretext for collateral objectives.1 0 2 In those cases, Powell would apply the traditional Brown test, requiring some "demonstrably effective break in the chain of events," 10 3 e.g., intervening circumstances previously acknowledged by the Court.
1 0 4 At the other end of the scale, Powell would relegate purely "technical" violations where officers acted in violation of the fourth amendment, but nonetheless did so reasonably and in good faith. 1 0 5 To admit a confession stemming from such a "technical" violation, Powell would require no more than proof that the police gave the defendant effective warning For support, Powell referred to Michigan v. Tucker: 1 0 7 "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which was deprived the defendant of some right."' ' 0 8 Thus, the good faith proposal rests on the behavioral assumption that there cannot be deterrence un-less the person being deterred knows with certainty when he is acting wrongly, and what the consequences of his misconduct will be. Moreover, Powell's good faith proposal seems to require a malice threshold for invoking the Brown test; unless the police have acted with malice, the confession will be admitted, unless, of course, the defendant had not been given his Miranda rights. 109 Police officers who are.acting in reliance upon a holding or statute which is later reversed or amended should not be penalized by the exclusion of evidence thereby obtained. 110 Yet, the blanket adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would be both unworkable and ineffective, for three reasons. First, a good faith exception requires a fact specific, case-by-case determination of whether to suppress evidence. This would create a myriad of incomprehensible standards for the police and the lower courts to follow."' Second, the good faith exception would diminish the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, both by increasing the uncertainty of its application, and by excusing law enforcement officers from learning the commands of the fourth amendment. 1 2 Third, the good faith exception utterly disregards the right of the private citizen to be free from illegal searches and seizures. 113
Proponents of the good faith exception contend that it is "grounded in objective reasonableness," ' " 4 and requires a showing of bona fide good faith on the part of the offending officer.' 15 Insertion of the phrase "bona fide" before "good faith" hardly guarantees objectivity. The application of a good faith exception would necessarily require a judicial determination not only of the officer's conduct, but of his belief as well. 116
The beliefs which will be scrutinized, however, will generally be fact-specific and it is doubtful that a ruling on one officer's belief will have any relevance on the reasonableness of another officer's beliefs. Each court deciding upon the reasonableness of a belief will engage in its own definition of reasonableness and then apply that standard to a belief which likely will never be encountered again in any fourth amendment case.' 1 7
It is therefore not speculative to assume that the good faith exception,
by adding yet another factor to the already fact burdened Brown test, would enhance the discretionary power of the trial judge and thus cast further uncertainty into the application of the exclusionary rule.
The difficulty ofjudicial determination, however, is not sufficient to repudiate the good faith exception. The ultimate test for any proposed modification of the exclusionary rule is whether it would successfully deter law enforcement officers from violating the commands of the fourth amendment." 1 8 The good faith exception would diminish the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule for two reasons. First, by requiring a determination of the officer's state of mind at the time he or she violated the fourth amendment, a good faith exception would create a myriad of fact specific decisions which would provide little guidance for an officer in the field.
Whenever exceptions to the exclusionary rule are made, the deterrence effect of the rule is in one sense diminshed. The rule becomes harder to understand, and the visitation of its consequences more uncertain .... By complicating the message of its holding, an attempt to be exact in the particular case may very well lead to confusion in general. . . .The deterrence value of the rule would be reduced because the ability of law officers to predict when the rule applies would be diminished.'
19
Unless the officer's actions were conspicuously flagrant, the result would likely be a tacit affirmance of fourth amendment violations, 1 20 because of the difficulty of proving scienter on the part of police, and also because a great many police errors are simply the result of a lack of experience, an excess of zeal, or both. 12 1 Deterrence would also be diminished because the good faith exception would likely "depress fourth amendment compliance to the level of our tolerance for the lowest standards of the least informed officer. And there would be no incentive to do better."' 122 The good faith exception would judge the officer's conduct at the time of the violation. Hence, it ignores the fact that even if officers act in good faith when they violate the fourth amendment, exclusion of evidence thereby obtained will deter them from future viola- [Vol. 73 tions, and will spur them on to learn the necessary intricacies of the fourth amendment. 23 Third, the good faith exception is utterly insensitive to the rights of citizens to be secure from illegal searches and seizures. It would judge the intrusion upon the privacy of the innocent and guilty alike, not on the basis of the victim's response to the intrusion, nor on the basis of whether the officer's conduct violated the fourth amendment, but solely on what the officer believed' to be the implications of his actions. To the victim of a fourth amendment violation it matters little whether or not the officer acted in good faith. 124 Nowhere does the fourth amendment speak of a law enforcement officer's belief in the rightness of his actions in terms of mitigating the severity of the command that a person has the right "to be secure. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures."' 1 25
Proponents of the good faith exception argue that it would enhance the public safety by denying the guilty an opportunity to be released when the police err. A study made by the Comptroller General of the United States shows that in only 1.3% of over 2,000 cases studied was evidence excluded as a result of a fourth amendment motion.' 26 If a search or seizure violates the fourth amendment it is per se unreasonable. Unless the defendant admits, or acts in such a way as to indicate decisively, that his or her confession was not the product of that illegality, then the presumption against the admission of the confession should stand.
The Taylor decision, while providing ample grist for the detractors of the exclusionary rule, does little in the way of setting the uniform standards which are a prerequisite for effective deterrence. While the Taylor majority refused to recognize a good faith exception, it still deemed it necessary to characterize the police misconduct as "flagrant" and "purposeful."
1 27 Detractors of the exclusionary rule argue that if the flagrancy of the official misconduct should be weighed heavily, then non-flagrant violations should militate against suppression. In this light the Taylor majority's decision not to recognize a good faith exception falls short of a clear and effective repudiation.
In the absence of clearly controlling standards of attenuation, lower courts have begun to construct their own alternatives. Most dramatically, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc in United States v. Williams,128 adopted a good faith exception in no uncertain language:
[W]e now hold that evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized. We do so because the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by police, not reasonable, good-faith ones.1
29
The support for the holding in Williams was fourfold: First, the fifth circuit contended that a wooden application of the exclusionary rule to good faith mistakes cannot have its intended deterrent effect., 30 133 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 130, at 740; 622 F.2d at 849 (Rubin, J., specially concurring). Rubin ascerbically commented that if four of the Supreme Court justices support a good faith rule, that leaves a majority ofjustices who oppose it. Furthermore, it is clear that the evidence in Williams would have been admitted notwithstanding the bold proclamation of the good faith rule; the 'illegal' arrest was made in reliance upon a statute which was later reconstrued. "The announcement of the rule as an alternative ground for decision in a case existence .... *41 In addition to this thinly veiled good faith argument, the Barry court apparently placed the burden of proving taint upon the defendant: "Statements following an illegal arrest must be excluded only if they are causally related to the invasion of the suspect's rights." 1 42 The Taylor Court's failure to establish clear and manageable guidelines for the interpretation of intervening circumstances and police misconduct will further encourage lower courts to define their own thresholds, and thereby subtly alter the presumption against the admission of tainted evidence. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES AND CONCLUSIONS
The Court in Taylor v. Alabama affirmed a vigilant conception of the exlusionary rule insofar as it applied the Brown test in a manner sensitive to the imperative of deterring fourth amendment violations. Yet the Court did not provide the guidelines necessary to ensure that other courts will apply the test in a like manner. The haphazard application of the Brown test has created the kind of uncertainty which is inconsistent with effective deterrence. Because application of the Brown test is highly fact specific, manageable standards are nonexistent. It might be years before the courts and the police will begin to have a reasonable idea of what constitutes attenuation in the multitudinous fact scenarios possible in fourth amendment cases. The likelihood of effective deterrence has been further diminished because the absence of manageable standards has encouraged courts to set up their own rules. Though the Taylor majority refused to recognize a good faith exception, the fifth circuit has capitalized on the ambiguous standard of attenuation in order to advocate just such an exception. By excusing law enforcement officers from learning the commands of the fourth amendment, and by generating a plethora of fact specific decisions, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule will undermine its deterrent effect, and leave the fourth amendment guarantee against illegal searches and seizures an empty shell.
While 939 (1982) many of the exclusionary rule's harshest critics acknowledge the ineffectiveness of the proposed alternatives. 145 The exclusionary rule, while problematic, is apparently the fairest and most effective way to deter fourth amendment violations. 146 Had the Taylor majority clearly modified the Brown test by establishing a high standard for intervention and severely limiting the relevance of the flagrancy of the official misconduct, the result would more effectively deter fourth amendment violations.
14 7 Unfortunately, since the Taylor Court did not so clarify the interpretive ambiguities of the Brown test, application of the exclusionary rule in cases where confessions may be tainted by illegal arrests will remain inconsistent and the deterrent effect will continue to be dissipated.
WILLIAM D. LEVINSON (suggests providing "an independent government official . . . who would investigate instances of alleged police misconduct, publicize the results of such investigations, and authorize the appointment of private counsel . . . to sue the offending official . . . when the ombudsman found probable cause to believe that an aggrieved person had been subjected to a deprivation of constitutional rights"). But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("I can see no insuperable obstacle to the elimination of the suppression doctrine if Congress would provide some meaningful and effective remedy against unlawful conduct by government officials. . . . I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression doctrine until some meaningful alternative can be developed.").
145 , 268 (1961) . But see Schlag, supra note 111, at 888 (Certainly one can conceive of any number of deterrents that might be as effective as the exclusionary rule; the problem is that such deterrents would impose other grave costs on society).
t46 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). t47 Perhaps the Taylor majority intended to do this, since it held the visit to Taylor was insufficient intervention, and that, though the police misconduct was characterized as "flagrant," it was not nearly as deliberate as the police misconduct in Brown and JDunaway. In a searing dissent in Rawlings, Justice Marshall eloquently warned:
A slow and steady erosion of the ability of victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures to obtain a remedy for the invasion of their rights saps the constitutional guarantee ofits life just as surely as would a substantive limitation. Because we are called on to decide whether evidence should be excluded only when a search has been 'successful,' it is easy to forget that the standards we announce determine what government conduct is reasonable in searches and seizures directed at persons who turn out to be innocent as well as those who are guilty. 448 U.S. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
